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Strikebreakers, Evictions and Violence:
Industrial Conflict in the
Hocking Valley, 1884-1885

In 1904 Boston trade unionist Frank K. Foster called the strikebreaker
an "industrial excresence . . . the Iscariot of the industrial world."
That same year novelist Jack London coined his famous definition of
the "scab." A strikebreaker, wrote London, "is a two-legged animal
with a corkscrew soul, a water-logged brain, and a combination backbone made of jelly and glue. Where others have hearts he carries a
tumor of rotten principles." So damnatory was London that he thought
strikers had the moral right to kill those who took their jobs and broke
their struggle.1
Like most trade unionists and radicals of his time, London assumed
that strikebreakers and violence went hand in hand. Labor historians
have also shared this view. In a recent survey of industrial violence,
H. M. Gitelman contends that the introduction of strikebreakers invariably produced sharp conflict. "Most worker-initiated strike violence," wrote Gitelman, "took the form of physical assaults upon
strikebreakers and upon fellow employees who attempted to cross
picket lines."2 Similarly, Philip Taft and Philip Ross believed that
strikers responded "to strikebreakers with anger. Many violent outbreaks followed efforts of strikers to restrain the entry of strikebreakers
and raw materials into the plant." In their wide-ranging survey of industrial violence, Taft and Ross found strikebreakers physically attacked in the Anthracite Strike of 1902, the Westmoreland County coal
strike of 1909-1912 and a host of other labor disputes.3 Additionally,
George Cotkin will receive his Ph.D. in History from The Ohio State University in
June 1978.
1. Frank K. Foster, "Reply to President Eliot," The Papers of Charles W. Eliot, Harvard University; Jack London, "The Scab," (1904) as quoted in Leonard Abbott, ed.,
London's Essays of Revolt (New York, 1928), 65.

2. H. M. Gitelman, "Perspectives on American Industrial Violence," Business History Review, XLVII (Spring 1973), 11, 15.

3. Philip Taft and Philip Ross, "American Labor Violence: Its Causes, Character,
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Gitelman, Taft and Ross argue that the presence of armed guards,
particularly in coal mining communities, usually led to armed and
violent confrontations.4
If workers shared Foster's and London's instinctive aversion to the
strikebreakers and if industrial violence is commonly provoked by the
introduction of strikebreakers, then one would expect to find in the
Hocking Valley coal strike of 1884-1885 a perfect case study to prove
the strikebreaker-industrial violence thesis. The main conditions for
violence were present: coal operators brought immigrant strikebreakers
into a predominately native-American mining community and insured
their work by posting armed guards at their properties. However, violence directed against the strikebreakers was rare, and when violence
actually flared, and it did, it was directed against the property of the
coal companies, especially those structures necessary for the continued
production of coal during the strike.
Tensions between Hocking Valley coal miners and coal mine operators certainly antedated the start of the Hocking Valley coal strike
of 1884-1885. Miners complained about the high prices charged by the
company store, unfair work rules and the lack of steady work. They
thought nothing good could come of the increasing monopolization of
the valley's mines. With the decline in the local ownership of the
mines, operators joined together in the spring of 1883 and consolidated
their holdings under one company, the Columbus and Hocking Coal
and Iron Co., derisively called "the Syndicate" by the miners. At
roughly the same time, operators created the Ohio Coal Exchange to
handle their labor relations in a centralized manner. Corporate offices
in Cleveland now dictated labor policies in the Valley.5 Miners thought
the Syndicate out to rob them of their traditional rights. Local miner
Andrew Brown believed that the Syndicate wished to break the "American miner down to the level of the pauperized miner of Europ [sic]." 6
Christopher Evans, President of District One of the Ohio Miners
and Outcome," Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives, eds.
Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York, 1969), 301, 381-82. Taft presents the same conclusions in briefer form in "Violence in American Labor Disputes,"
American Academy of Political and Social Science Annals, CCCLXIV (March 1966),

127-40. In a recent article on the Hocking Valley coal strike of 1884-1885, Frank
Levstik connects the introduction of strikebreakers with the beginnings of violence. "The
Hocking Valley Miners' Strike, 1884-1885: A Search for Order," The Old
Northwest,
II (March 1976), 55-56.
4. Taft and Ross, "American Labor Violence," 301-02; Gitelman, "Perspectives,"
15.
5. John W. Lozier, "The Hocking Valley Coal Miners' Strike, 1884-1885" (M. A.
thesis, The Ohio State University, 1963), 36-37.
6. Andrew Brown to Governor George Hoadly, September 18, 1884, The Papers of
George Hoadly, The Ohio Historical Society (hereafter cited as Hoadly Papers).
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Amalgamated Association, considered the Syndicate a gigantic monopoly "bent upon crushing poor humanity."7
Sharp and unilaterally imposed wage reductions precipitated the
Hocking Valley coal strike of 1884-1885. In March 1884 operators
slashed the rates for coal mined from 80 cents to 70 cents per ton.
Given the soft demand for coal and the increasing competition from
out-of-state fields miners reluctantly accepted the pay cut. One month
later the operators asked the miners to accept another reduction, this
time down to 50 cents per ton. The miners refused to agree this time,
and they continued mining coal at the old wage rate until late June.
The operators then decided to unilaterally cut the rate to 60 cents per
ton and on Friday evening, June 20, they posted the new tonnage rates
at the mines. On Monday, June 23, the miners stayed home. According to Christoper Evans, three thousand miners and one thousand
helpers struck, closing down forty-six mines in the valley.8
It was a long and grueling strike, "the bitterest strike in the entire
mining industry of America," wrote economist Edward Bemis in 1888.9
Lasting for over nine months, the strike ended in total defeat for the
miners when on March 18, 1885, the last strikers announced in New
Straitsville that they accepted the operators' terms. The work stoppage
lasted so long because of intransigence on the part of both the operators
and the miners. Under heavy competition from other coal fields, especially those in the Pittsburgh area, southern Ohio coal operators used
the strike to win a more favorable market position by breaking the
miners' union and reducing their wage bill. In sharp contrast, the
miners sought to maintain their old wage rates and conditions of work
and prevent the operators from forcing them to become "voluntary
serfs and miserable menials."10
In its general outlines, then, the Hocking Valley coal strike of
1884-1885 resembled many labor disputes of the Gilded Age and closely
followed the pattern of the big Hocking Valley coal strike of 18731874.11 In that conflict the operators had successfully used strikebreakers to end the strike, and in 1884 they again recruited strikebreakers to keep their mines in production and thereby break the economic power of the miners' union. On July 14, a few weeks after
7. Testimony of Christopher Evans, Proceedings of the Hocking Valley
Investigation
Committee (Columbus, 1885), 31-32 (hereafter cited as Proceedings).

8. Levstik, "Miners' Strike," 56.
9. E. W. Bemis, "Mine Labor in the Hocking Valley," Publications of the American
Economic Association, VIIl (July 1888), 27.

10. Testimony of John McBride, Proceedings, 308.
11. For a complete account of the 1873-1874 strike see Herbert G. Gutman,
"Reconstruction in Ohio: Negroes in the Hocking Valley Coal Mines in 1873 and 1874,"
Labor
History, III (Fall 1962), 243-64. Also see Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 40-43.
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the miners refused to work for lower wages, the first group of strike-

breakers accompanied by one hundred Pinkerton Guards entered the
Valley. The operators had initially tried to hire skilled coal miners

as strikebreakers, but they were unsuccessful, and most of the first
group of three hundred strikebreakers were unskilled Italians. "All

members of our Order," the Knights of Labor declared, "will stay
away . . .until the difficulty is settled." The operators were forced to
rely upon unskilled laborers, mainly Italians, Germans, Poles, Hungarians, Swedes and some Virginia Negroes to fill their labor needs. 12
The arrival of strikebreakers and their armed guardians caused little
trouble. The pro-labor Hocking Sentinel considered the new laborers

a "social ulcer in our midst," but most Valley miners also agreed
with the paper's advice to "keep cool, be peaceable, orderly and respect all offices and conduct themselves according to law." The reception accorded the strikebreakers was so mild that the operators sent
the Pinkertons away on July 26. As the strike entered its second
month the strikebreakers appeared safe and unmolested.13
12. Gutman, "Reconstruction," 256-257. Journal of United Labor, August 25, 1884;
Testimony of J. A. Donley, Proceedings, 81; Testimony of Christopher Evans, Ibid.,
46; New Lexington Herald, December 18, 1884; Hocking Sentinel, August 14, 1884.
13. Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 60-64; Levstik, "Miners' Strike," 57-58.
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Valley miners did not believe the strikebreakers "menacing and terrible" as Jack London would later describe them.14 Instead, local miners
viewed the strikebreakers as misguided and uninformed, but morally
innocent. The operators used "disreputable methods" and misrepresented the conditions in the Valley to lure foreign-born strikebreakers
into the mines, stated union leader John McBride.15 Not only were the
strikebreakers deceived, but they were thought by Hocking Valley
strikers to be the epitome of exploited and servile labor. Miner J. A.
Donley sympathized openly with their plight. "They don't lead a very
happy life," he stated, "they are starving about half the time . . . and
when a man is hungry, I don't think his life is very happy."16
Two other perceptions held by miners tended to lessen antipathy
toward the strikebreakers. First, proud Hocking Valley coal miners refused to believe that unskilled foreign laborers could take their places,
despite the fact that the operators had imported the latest machinery
to aid the unskilled strikebreakers. One newspaper report stated, "the
general opinion among older miners is that the Italians will prove a
failure."17 The miners, perhaps blinded by craft pride, refused to believe themselves replaceable.
Another factor worked against reprisals upon the strikebreakers. The
miners believed that their strike was being fought for basic human
rights as well as wage increases. The miners were engaged "in a
decisive battle between monopoly on the one hand and organized
labor on the other."18 Miner R. H. Miller characterized his profession
and the Syndicate's greed more poignantly. Miller accepted physical
injury and degredation as part of the price that miners paid for defying
nature's laws. Nature punished miners for taking her precious minerals
by making them "humpbacked, undersized, and bowlegged." But Miller
was repelled by the Syndicate's attempts to humiliate further the poor
and physically degraded miners by refusing to pay them a decent
wage.19 Consequently, the miners perceived the strikebreakers not as
machines or villians but as pitiable men robbed of their basic human
dignity. Striking miners uncovered in the slavish strikebreakers the
human misery that they themselves sought to avoid.
Their empathy toward the immigrant strikebreaker increased with
reports that the newcomers were voluntarily leaving the mines or rebel-

14. Abbott, ed., London's Essays of Revolt, 65.
15. Testimony of John McBride, Proceedings, 308.
16. Testimony of J. A. Donley, Ibid., 87.
17. Athens Messenger, July 17, 1884; Hocking Sentinel, July 17, August 14, 1884.
18. Ibid., July 31, 1884.
19. Testimony of R. H. Miller, Proceedings, 118.
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ling against the operators. At the end of July the Athens Messenger
reported that "lately imported Italian miners are abandoning work
. . in a body." The former strikebreakers, the story continued, were
then taken "in hand by the strikers" and given breakfast and the assurance of transportation out of the valley.20 The Hocking Sentinel
devoted considerable space to the shooting of an Italian strikebreaker
by a Pinkerton guard. Apparently, the strikebreaker had become noisy
after heavy drinking. Unable to quiet the Italian down, the angry
Pinkerton shot him to death. After this incident many enraged Italian
miners left their new jobs. The newspaper account characterized the
strikebreakers' "job action" in terms that must have elated striking
miners. "The uprising of the Italians in defense of an injury to one of
them," the paper stated, "shows conclusively that they will be as
vigorous in their demands for justice as have been those who labored
in the mines before them."21
Convinced that the strikebreakers were capable of noble sentiments,
the strikers pursued a peaceful policy toward these new men. Immediately upon entering the Valley the strikebreakers were greeted by
strikers' verbal appeals that they return home. The initial confrontation
between striker and strikebreaker was peaceful. A man identified as a
leading Nelsonville striker told the Athens Messenger that the strikers
would use persuasion and not force to convince strikebreakers to leave
the mines.22 Thus the newspaper reported that while foreign laborers
"continue to arrive in this valley by squads, they are not here long
before being induced by the strikers to abandon work."23
The striking miners believed their "persuasive eloquence" would
work, and remarkably, this strategy succeeded for a time in convincing
many strikebreakers to leave. But such a tactic was doomed to failure,
because for every handful of strikebreakers who left, hundreds more
arrived to take their jobs in the mines.24 By November 1884 over 1,500
strikebreakers were at work in fifteen Hocking Valley mines.25 Perplexed by the failure of their arguments to convince more strikebreakers to leave, some miners resorted to psychological intimidation
of the newcomers. In January 1885 strikers were reported to be arming
themselves. According to an observer, the miners intended the guns
for show and hoped that the strikebreakers in the Nelsonville area

20. Athens Messenger, July 31, 1884.
21. Hocking Sentinel, September 18, 25, 1884.
22. Athens Messenger, July 17, 1884.
23. Ibid., July 31, 1884.
24. Ibid., August 7, 1884.
25. Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 61.
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would be frightened into leaving their jobs. Such incidents remained
few and they usually failed, however. 26
The introduction of strikebreakers into the Valley had failed to provoke a violent confrontation either with the operators, their hired
Pinkertons or with the replacement labor force itself. When violence
did start it came from another quarter. Many miners lived in housing
owned by the Syndicate and at the end of July the news quickly
spread that the operators would soon begin evictions of those still on
strike. Local observers were convinced that such action was designed
to inflame the miners. The Hocking Sentinel believed that the purpose
of the evictions
is to provoke men whose wives and children are driven into the storm to a
breach of the peace . . . so that the state authorities can be called to aid
in forcing the outrage which the lousy Italians and the armed Pinkertons
failed to accomplish. Eviction is dangerous in downtrodden Ireland. It is not an
American system and had best not be enforced.27

26. Wm. Dalrymple to Governor George Hoadly, January 26, 1885, Hoadly Papers.
Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 60-62; Athens Messenger, August 7, 1884.
27. Hocking Sentinel, July 31, 1884. Levstik, "Miners' Strike," 57.
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The miners vowed to resist forcefully evictions and the Syndicate's
"total disregard of the rights of others." Operators were warned that
their property would be destroyed if they evicted miners from company
housing.28
Despite these warnings, the operators on July 31, 1884, evicted
some miners and sued in court to remove all strikers from companyowned housing. By August 2, violence flared as miners assaulted mine
guards and fired at a Hocking Valley train.29 Sporadic violence continued for a few days, but then subsided. Most miners and their families
ignored their eviction notices, and, faced with widespread civil disobedience, the operators feared to act. The evictees also had their day in
court before Judge Elias Boudinot, a man openly sympathetic to their
cause. Boudinot ruled that the rental agreement signed by the operators
with the miners was not voided by a strike. To rub salt on the operators' wounds, Boudinot forced the plaintiff, a Syndicate-affiliated coal
mine owner, to pay all of the court's costs.30
The question of the operators' right to evict strikers from companyowned housing remained the key to violence in the Valley. After
another court on August 25 allowed the operators to evict strikers,
close to four hundred miners rioted in Buchtel.31 Still another court
ruled on August 28 against the miners' right to remain in companyowned houses during a strike. When miners are discharged, the court
ruled, the house rental contracts cease to be in effect. Immediately
after this decision was rendered, one observer predicted that "trouble
may be expected." The evictions of the final days of August and the
early part of September coincided with widespread conflict and disruption. A number of strikers attacked the camps of strikebreakers at
Lonstreth, Snake Hollow and Straitsville. In the attack some two or
three hundred shots were fired. Later, near Straitsville, strikers set the
hopper of Mine Number Seven on fire.32
The New York Times contended that the bloodshed and destruction
resulted from miners being "goaded to madness" after having been

28. M. P. Finegard to Governor George Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly Papers: Testimony of
John McBride, Proceedings, 307.
29. Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 72; Athens Messenger, August 7, 1884.
30. Ibid.; Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 71-72. In a letter to Governor Hoadly prior
to the trial, Boudinot accused company guards of keeping "by force and violence . . .
free citizens from Public Highway," and argued against the need for Pinkertons in the
valley. Elias Boudinot to Governor George Hoadly, July 15, 1884; Telegram to Governor George Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly Papers.
31. Levstik, "Miners' Strike," 58.
32. Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 71-72; G. R. Carr to Col. Dill, September 4,
1884,
Hoadly Papers; Levstik, "Miners' Strike," 58.
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driven from their homes.33 The strikers' violent acts forced local law
enforcement officials to declare life and property in imminent danger.
Hocking County Sheriff J. J. McCarthy wired Ohio Governor George
Hoadly, "I am worn out . . . All means in my power are exhausted
to repress disorder and protect life and property. Please send
militia immediately and save further bloodshed."34
The Governor dispatched the militia, and he made a personal
visit to the Valley as well. In Nelsonville strikers demanded of the
governor "What's to become of the people turned out of houses?"
"I will send them tents," replied Hoadly.35 The violence abated with the
moral and physical presence of the militia, the easy acquisition of tents
and the willingness of home-owning miners to take in evictees. With
calm apparently restored, Hoadly withdrew the bulk of the militia
in mid-September.36 Occasional violence continued over the next few
months. Significantly, much of it was directed against the company
housing once inhabited by strikers. A number of company homes were
burned to the ground in mid-November, including a new boarding
house built to house strikebreakers near Straitsville.37
If violence to prevent evictions represented a "defensive" effort by
strikers, violence against company property was a more "aggressive"
tactic designed to help win the actual strike. On the offensive, union
miners attacked poorly guarded mine buildings, tools, hoppers, shutes
and bridges that were key links in the movement of coal already
mined. Some actual coal mines were set on fire but since such conflagrations could burn for years this practice was soon discontinued
when it became clear that such tactics permanently destroyed the
miners' means of livelihood.38
These skillful attacks greatly panicked the operators and their allies.
A railroad president wrote to the governor of Ohio that strikers
have burned coal hoppers, set fires to the mines several of which are still
33. New York Times, September 2, 1884.
34. W. E. Hamblin to J. J. McCarthy, September 10, 1884; J. J. McCarthy to Governor George Hoadly, September 10, 1884; John Brashears to Governor George
Hoadly, August 31, 1884, Hoadly Papers.
35. Hocking Sentinel, September 4, 18, 1884; New Lexington Herald, September
11,
1884.
36. T. T. Dill to Governor George Hoadly, September 8, 1884, Hoadly Papers. E.
B.
Finley to Governor George Hoadly, September 11, 1884, The Papers of the Adjutant
General, The Ohio Historical Society, Series 154 (hereafter cited as Adjutant General
Papers); Andrew Brown to Governor George Hoadly, September 18, 1884, Hoadly
Papers; Lozier, "Coal Miners' Strike," 72.
37. Athens Messenger, November 13, 27, 1884.
38. President of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad to Governor
George Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly Papers; Athens Messenger, October 16, 1884.
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burning. Last night all our wires were cut, we learn through messengers
that a serious attack . . . burned three of our bridges on Monday Creek and
Sand Run branches. Are the operators and our railroad Company to be left
at the mercy of such men or can we have the protection of the state so
that the operators can work their properties & the railroad be open.39
Each actual fire brought forth a torrent of rumored arson plots. The
operators and their supporters thrived on rumors of anticipated violence, hopeful that they might bring large numbers of state militiamen
back into the Valley. When stationed there, the militia protected the
operators' property and investments at a cost substantially lower than
that of an army of Pinkertons.40
The operators, as well as other observers, correctly analyzed the
relationship between actual acts of sabotage and the miners' goal of
preventing strikebreakers from mining coal. The burning of the Central
Coal Company's shutes at New Straitsville just one day prior to the
arrival of strikebreakers at that mine highlighted such incidents of
directed violence. One newspaper concluded that the destruction of the
shutes ended any need for strikebreakers in the area.41 Similarly,
in January 1885, it was reported that
the sending of imported Negro miners to work near New Straitsville is
supposed to be the cause for firing the tunnel at Bristol, as in that manner,
transportation is checked, and so would be the work of the imported colored
men.
The tactic of directed violence failed also. As the winter dragged
on many miners were either forced to return to work or to seek jobs
in other fields. Efforts by local business and civic leaders to mediate
the dispute were rejected by Syndicate operators confident of their
ability to maintain production with a corps of imported strikebreakers.
In March defeated miners returned to work on the operators' terms.
Wages in Syndicate mines started at forty cents per ton, while fifty
cents was paid in other parts of the Valley.
Strike violence in the Hocking Valley coal strike followed the pattern
uncovered by George Rude and other new social historians in their
studies of pre-industrial violence. When conflict occurred during a food
riot or strike, Rude found that it was directed against private property
39. President of the Pittsburgh, Cincinnati and St. Louis Railroad to Governor
George Hoadly, n.d., Hoadly Papers.
40. Governor George Hoadly to Col. T. Dill, September 3, 1884; Col. T. Dill to
Governor George Hoadly, September 3, 1884, Adjutant General Papers; M. M. Greene to
Governor George Hoadly, September 1, 1884, Hoadly Papers.
41. New Lexington Herald, September 4, 1884.
42. Ibid., January 8, 1885.
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and not against individuals.43 Despite their frustration in fighting a
losing battle, Hocking Valley miners conducted themselves in an essentially disciplined and humane manner. While painfully aware that the
mines must be kept closed, the strikers refused to attack the strikebreakers because they saw them as fellow victims of a harsh economic
system. Instead, the miners vented their anger and violence in an essentially pre-industrial mode.
Because they were perceived as unknowing pawns of the operators, strikebreakers escaped the violence that later marked mine strikes
in the twentieth century. Perhaps this change in perception and action
resulted from twenty years of additional labor strife; perhaps it resulted from the breakdown of community solidarity between the working class and the middle class and within the working class itself.
Whatever the reason for this transformation, in the Hocking Valley
coal strike of 1884-1885 the strikers imposed clear limitations upon
the forms of violence they employed and the objects toward which
their violence was directed.

43. George Rude. The Crowd in History, 1730-1848

